

REFER TO DOS

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DE WTE 4044 2380057
O 250100Z AUG 76
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 239//
TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT/VAIL
ZEM
UNCLAS WH61150

TOR
250110Z

DOS REVIEWED 12-Nov-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

TOSCO 239

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, UNSC, TU, GR

SUBJECT: GREEK/TURKISH DISPUTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
THE FOLLOWING DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS TABLED AT NOON
AUGUST 24. IN CONFORMITY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL
PRACTICES, IT WAS MARKED AS "PROVISIONAL"

QUOTE

FRANCE, ITALY, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : DRAFT RESOLUTION
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

TAKING NOTE OF THE LETTER OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF GREECE DATED 10 AUGUST,

HAVING HEARD AND NOTED THE VARIOUS POINTS MADE IN THE STATEMENTS
BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF GREECE AND TURKEY,
EXPRESSING ITS CONCERN OVER THE PRESENT TENSIONS BETWEEN GREECE
AND TURKEY IN RELATION TO THE AEGEAN SEA,

BEARING IN MIND THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER CONCERNING THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS
WELL AS THE VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER VI OF THE CHARTER
CONCERNING PROCEDURES AND METHODS FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLE-
MENT OF DISPUTES,

NOTING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RESUMPTION AND CONTINUANCE OF
DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY TO RESOLVE
THEIR DIFFERENCES,

CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR THE PARTIES BOTH TO RESPECT EACH OTHER'S
INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AND TO AVOID ANY INCIDENT
WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO THE AGGRAVATION OF THE SITUATION, AND
WHICH CONSEQUENTLY MIGHT COMPROMISE THEIR EFFORTS TOWARDS A PEACE-
FUL SOLUTION,

1. APPEALS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND TURKEY TO
EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION;
2. URGES THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND TURKEY TO DO
EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER TO REDUCE THE PRESENT TENSIONS
IN THE AREA SO THAT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS MAY BE FACI-
LITATED;

3. CALLS ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND TURKEY
TO RESUME DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS OVER THEIR DIFFERENCES AND
APPEALS TO THEM TO DO EVERYTHING WITHIN THEIR POWER
TO ENSURE THAT THESE RESULT IN MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS;
4. INVITES THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND TURKEY IN THIS

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RESPECT TO CONTINUE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONTRIBUTION
THAT APPROPRIATE JUDICIAL MEANS, IN PARTICULAR THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE ARE QUALIFIED TO MAKE TO THE SETTLEMENT OF
ANY REMAINING LEGAL DIFFERENCES WHICH THEY MAY IDENTIFY IN
CONNEXION WITH THEIR PRESENT DISPUTE.

UNQUOTE
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SENSITIVE

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#240

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DELIVER IN SEALED ENVELOPE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: LARRY EAGLEBURGER

(1) The Secretary would like you to look at the attached
and see what you think of the draft reply.

(2) Warm regards.

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SECRET

SENSITIVE

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SECRET

S:LSEAGLEBURGER:ML
8/24/76 EXT. 21500
S - MR. EAGLEBURGER

S/S

S ONLY

IMMEDIATE BELGRADE

NODIS
CHEROKEE FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: YO, APER

SUBJECT:

1. THANKS FOR YOUR RESPONSE TO MY EARLIER CABLE. WE HAVE NOW BOTH STATED OUR VIEWS AND I SEE LITTLE PURPOSE TO BE SERVED BY CONTINUING THE EXCHANGE. I HAVE, THEREFORE, ONLY THE FOLLOWING BRIEF COMMENTS.

2. FIRST, WITH REGARD TO THE TOTH CASE, YOU APPARENTLY ACCEPT THE CHRONOLOGY, BUT ARGUE THAT THE PART PLAYED BY THE DEPARTMENT WAS A CONSEQUENCE OF YOUR URGING. THAT MAY WELL BE THE CASE, BUT IT IS HARDLY A QUESTION I CAN ADJUDICATE FROM HERE.

3. SECOND, THERE IS THE QUESTION OF MINIC'S VISIT. HIS INVITATION, AS I TOLD YOU EARLIER, WAS ARRANGED DURING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO BELGRADE, AND WAS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT TOOK PLACE AT THAT TIME. FURTHERMORE, WHEN HE ISSUED THE INVITATION HE HAD ALREADY BEEN HELD AT ARMS LENGTH FOR MORE THAN TWO YEARS, DURING WHICH PERIOD HE HAD CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO SEE HIM.

4. ALSO, AS YOU KNOW VERY WELL, I PERSONALLY RAISED THE TOTH CASE WITH MINIC WHILE HE WAS HERE. I DID SO IN A

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PRIVATE SESSION, BECAUSE OF MY STRONG VIEW THAT THE BEST RESULTS IN CASES OF THIS SORT ARE ACCOMPLISHED IN PRIVATE MEETINGS WHERE NO ONE FEELS COMPELLED TO DEMONSTRATE HIS TANKHOOD TO THOSE OF HIS COLLEAGUES WHO MAY BE IN THE ROOM WITH HIM.

5. THIRD, WITH REGARD TO WHAT YOU HAVE TO SAY ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY, I COULD NOT AGREE MORE. I FAIL, HOWEVER, TO DISCERN THE RELEVANCE OF YOUR LECTURE TO THE POINT I MADE ABOUT THE NEED TO BUILD LONG-TERM PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR OUR POLICY TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA IN A POST-TITO ENVIRONMENT. CLEARLY PUBLICITY HAS A ROLE TO PLAY -- AS DOES QUIET DIPLOMACY -- IN MODERATING "YUGOSLAV BEHAVIOR INIMICAL TO U.S. INTERESTS." BUT THERE ARE SURELY LIMITS TO THE DEGREE TO WHICH YUGOSLAVIA -- WHICH BROKE WITH STALIN AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER ON THE ISSUE OF ITS INDEPENDENCE -- CAN BE PUBLICLY PUSHED AROUND. AND, IN ANY EVENT, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP CAN BE MEASURED BY THE DECIDEL COUNT.

6. LET ME CLOSE WITH TWO FINAL POINTS YOU HAVE RAISED WITH ME IN OTHER CABLES. I HAVE INSTRUCTED EUR TO HANDLE BELOVSKI AND HIS STAFF IN A MANNER RECIPROCAL TO THE WAY YOU AND YOUR STAFF ARE TREATED IN BELGRADE. I MIGHT POINT OUT THAT BELOVSKI HAS NEVER SEEN ME FOR AN OFFICIAL CALL SINCE HE HAS BEEN HERE. IN FACT, HE MADE A STRONG PITCH TO EAGLEBURGER IN KANSAS CITY THAT HE HAVE A FEW MINUTES WITH ME ALONE BEFORE HIS RETURN TO BELGRADE (HE IS THERE NOW), BUT WAS TURNED DOWN.

7. AS TO THE QUESTION OF YOUR RESIGNATION, I HAVE ALREADY TOLD YOU THAT I FEEL STRONGLY YOU SHOULD STAY. YOUR DECISION CANNOT BE BASED ON THE INSIGHTS YOU MAY THINK ARE GAINED BY READING INTERCEPTS, ANY MORE THAN THE USG CAN BE SEEN TO BE ACCOMMODATING TO YUGOSLAV "DISPLEASURE." YOUR DEPARTURE NOW WOULD ONLY GIVE THE FORCES YOU DEPLORE WITHIN YUGOSLAVIA AN UNNECESSARY VICTORY. THE PRESIDENT AND I HAVE BOTH REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED OUR CONFIDENCE IN YOU, AND MEANT IT. WHILE I HAVE NOT THE FOGGIEST NOTION OF WHAT THE PRESIDENT INTENDS AFTER THE NOVEMBER ELECTION, I CAN

ASSURE YOU THAT AMBASSADORIAL APPOINTMENTS WILL NOT BE MADE BY EE.

8. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE ALL PUT PAST DIFFERENCES AND PRESENT CONCERNS BEHIND US AND GET BACK TO BUSINESS.

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EYES ONLY**SECRET****SENSITIVE****EVOLUATIVE****SECRET**

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NOD963

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

067230

P 201315Z AUG 76
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7761

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 5469

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR SILBERMAN

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: YD

REFS: (A) STATE 100187 (B) BELGRADE 4464 (C) BELGRADE 5084

1. I HAVE GIVEN A GOOD DEAL OF THOUGHT TO YOUR CABLE
AS I PROMISED AND HERewith IS MY RESPONSE.

REVIEW OF BIDDING

2. I AM SURPRISED YOU FEEL AGGRIEVED AT MY CRITICISM
OF EE; IT WAS CERTAINLY FORESHADOWED. I THOUGHT YOU HAD
AGREED IN PARIS TO EFFECTIVELY REBUT THE ITEM IN THE
WSJ AND TO ASSERT YOUR SUPPORT OF MY ACTIONS IN BELGRADE.
I REMINDED YOU AND LARRY SEVERAL TIMES OF THAT AND
IN REPTEL (U) MADE CLEAR THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH
ACTION I WOULD HAVE "NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO DEFEND
MYSELF." (ALTHOUGH LARRY'S LUNCH WITH BELOVSKI WAS
HELPFUL, I EMPHASIZED TO BOTH OF YOU THAT IN MY VIEW
IT WAS INSUFFICIENT.) SINCE THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
LEAK AROSE OUT OF MY EFFORTS HERE ON BEHALF OF TOTN,
EFFORTS CRITICIZED BY EE, (THE JOURNAL TOLD
ME SOURCES WERE AUTHORITY-TYPE IMPLYING SENIOR TYPES
IN EE), I THOUGHT IT APPROPRIATE TO USE THE OCCASION OF
TOTN'S RELEASE TO FORTIFY ACCOUNTS AS WELL AS EFFECTIVELY WARN
AMERICAN DIAL. No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-267-5-2-8
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SECRET SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY

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*Department of State***TELEGRAM****SECRET**

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I NEVER INTENDED TO DO SO INEFFECTIVELY.

3. AS I TOLD YOU IN PARIS, THE WSJ PIECE CONFIRMED WHAT THE GOY HAD ALREADY PICKED UP IN WASHINGTON; I.E., EE WAS UNDERMINING MY POSITION HERE IN BELGRADE. BY PUBLICLY CRITICIZING EE, I DID NOT TELL THE GOY ANYTHING THAT IT DIDN'T ALREADY KNOW; I HOPED THAT YOUR UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT WOULD DISARM THEIR EFFORTS TO DIVIDE AND CONQUER.

4. I DON'T BELIEVE THERE WAS ANY MISUNDERSTANDING CONCERNING MY SPEECH AT RLED. I SAW NO REASON TO "CLEAR THE SPEECH" WITH EE. THE SUBSTANCE TRACKED CLOSELY WITH THE SPEECH CARROLL BROWN, THEN DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF EE, HAD GIVEN BEFORE THE SAME AUDIENCE IN NEW YORK (AT MY URGING). IN ANY EVENT, I WOULD NOT CONSULT BUREAUCRATS AS TO THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE SPEECH AND IT WAS NOT IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO COMMAND YOUR ATTENTION. AMBASSADOR BELOVSKI DID NOT INFORM DEPARTMENT OF DECISION TO RELEASE TOTH UNTIL AFTER MY SPEECH WAS GIVEN AND THE GOY KNEW BEFOREHAND THAT I WAS GOING TO RAISE TOTH IN THE SPEECH. IT IS ALSO WORTH NOTING THAT EVEN THEN BELOVSKI REFUSED TO GIVE A SPECIFIC DATE. SO IN THAT RESPECT, HIS ANNOUNCEMENT WAS REALLY NOTHING NEW (VARIOUS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOY HAD BEEN SAYING FOR OVER SIX MONTHS THAT TOTH WOULD BE RELEASED EVENTUALLY).

5. IF YOU EXAMINE THE REMARKS THAT I MADE AT THE AIRPORT (BELGRADE 5084), YOU WILL SEE THAT I DID NOT SAY THAT THE EAST EUROPEAN SECTION JUSTIFIED INADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR MY EFFORTS TO RELEASE TOTH ON GROUNDS HE WAS A RECENT CITIZEN (ALTHOUGH ONE OFFICIAL DID MENTION THAT AS A MITIGATING FACTOR). I AM SURE EE WOULD BE EQUALLY INEFFECTIVE ON BEHALF OF A SIXTH GENERATION AMERICAN. MY STATEMENT REFERRED TO THE YUGOSLAVS WHO CONTINUALLY MADE THAT POINT AND STILL DO.

6. I WAS SURPRISED BY THE EAST EUROPEAN SECTION'S
MIDDLE AND JUDICIAL SECTION'S REACTION TO THE RELEASE OF TOTH

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WHO ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. I REMEMBER YOUR COMMENTS IN PARIS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FOREIGN SERVICE ONCE WORKED IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES, LATER FOR THE INTEREST OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND NOW IN THE INTEREST OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE. MOREOVER, THEIR COWARDLY ANONYMOUS LEAKS AS REFLECTED IN BOTH THE WSJ PIECE AND THE RECENT TIME AND NEWSWEEK ARTICLES REVEAL THAT THEY ARE PERFECTLY ABLE TO DEFEND THEMSELVES; THEY ARE SIMPLY UNWILLING TO DO SO OPENLY.

THE TOTH CASE

7. AS I TOLD YOU EARLIER THE CHRONOLOGY WHICH THE DEPARTMENT DISTRIBUTED IS MISLEADING AND INACCURATE. A CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF ALL THE CABLES WILL SHOW THAT THE DEPARTMENT DID NOT DO A DAMN THING OTHER THAN WHAT I PRESSED THEM TO DO AND THEN DID IT IN A RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVE FASHION. PERHAPS MOST DAMAGING WAS MINIC FALL VISIT WHICH GAVE GOY IMPRESSION THAT DEPARTMENT, AS OPPOSED TO CONGRESS, DID NOT CARE THAT MUCH ABOUT TOTH CASE OR FOR THAT MATTER OTHER CONTENTIOUS ISSUES. (I AM SURE THE FACT THAT YOU DID NOT RAISE TOTH WITH SECRETARY MINIC REFLECTED INADEQUATE STAFF WORK). I FOUND IT NECESSARY IN NOVEMBER TO CHIDE EE BY WRITING (BELGRADE 6172) "IT IS TRAGIC IN PRINCIPLE IF SOME IN DEPARTMENT GIVE IMPRESSION THEY CARE LITTLE OF ISSUES OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO AMERICANS AS A PEOPLE." AS EARLY AS OCTOBER AND REPEATEDLY THEREAFTER I URGED DEPARTMENT TO PUBLICLY WARN AMERICANS OF DUAL NATIONALITY ABOUT THE RISKS OF TRAVELING TO YUGOSLAVIA, AN ACTION WHICH WAS NOT TAKEN IN MARCH BUT ONLY QUITE RECENTLY (AND RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVELY). AT LEAST ONE COURAGEOUS OFFICER IN EE IN A PRIVATE LETTER TO ME DID RECOGNIZE DEPARTMENT'S INADEQUACIES ON TOTH CASE STATING "WE HAVE PUSSYFOOTED AROUND TOO LONG."

8. IN LATE NOVEMBER I RESPONDED TO QUERIES FROM NYTIMES AND WASHINGTON POST ABOUT THE CASE AFTER THE WIRE SERVICES HAD PICKED UP AN ANNOUNCEMENT IN COLORADO. WHEN I MET ART HALLMAN IN LONDON THE NEXT MONTH HE TOLD

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ME EE HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF THAT AND HAD EVEN TOLD HIM THAT I HAD INITIATED PRESS ATTENTION BY MAKING THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN BELGRADE. I AM INFORMED THAT EE AND THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON CLUCK-CLUCKED MUTUALLY ABOUT MY STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS WHICH OF COURSE DID NOT STRENGTHEN MY POSITION OR HELP TOTH.

9. IT WAS OUR CONCLUSION THAT DEPARTMENTAL BRIEFINGS OF CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS ABOUT THAT CASE--AND INDEED ABOUT OTHER ISSUES OF CONCERN IN U.S.-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS WERE INADEQUATE. IT WAS NECESSARY TO DO THE JOB IN BELGRADE.

10. FINALLY, AS I TOLD DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARMITAGE IN MAY, I WAS TROUBLED BY THE FACT THAT NO DEPARTMENT OFFICER CALLED BELOVSKI IN ON THE TOTH

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01/ ISO-00 /001 W

067252

P 201315Z AUG 76
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7782

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BELGRADE 5469

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR SILBERMAN

CASE ALONE AND REALLY PINNED HIM ON THE ISSUE. MY JUDGEMENT IS THAT HE RAN RINGS AROUND EE. I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE RAISED THE ISSUE DUTIFULLY IN EVERY MEETING WITH BELOVSKI FOR THE ENTIRE SEVEN YEARS OF TOT'S SENTENCE.

11. I MUST SAY, HOWEVER, THAT ART HARTMAN, WHEN HE DID GET INVOLVED, WAS MUCH BETTER. PARENTHETICALLY -- AS I HAVE TOLD ART -- IT IS A SHAME THAT HE DID NOT SPEND MORE TIME TOGETHER FROM THE BEGINNING OF MY ASSIGNMENT HERE.

12. IN SUM THEN, MY DISAGREEMENTS WITH EE OVER THE TOT CASE ARE TYPICAL. ON THIS, AS ON MANY OTHER ISSUES, MY JUDGEMENT IS THAT THEY WERE NOT TOUGH ENOUGH. THEY DO NOT PRESS ISSUES TO CLOSURE AND IF I WERE YOU I WOULDN'T LET THEM NEGOTIATE THE SALE OF AN ICE CREAM CONE. I WAS HEARTENED BY ART'S ADMISSION TO ME WHEN HE WAS IN BELGRADE THAT HE WAS NOT ENAMORED WITH THE PERSONNEL. IN EE. LOEWENSTEIN ONCE SUGGESTED THAT THE DUBCEK CRISIS OF 1968 KNOCKED THE STUFFING OUT OF THE OFFICERS SPECIALIZING IN EAST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS WHICH CONFIRMS THE WISDOM OF YOUR GLOP POLICY. THE BEST OFFICERS I HAVE SEEN DEALING WITH EAST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS HAVE COME FROM OUTSIDE THE REGION OR FROM MOSCOW.

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GEM SECONDLY, EE CONTINUOUSLY OBJECTED TO MY PROVIDING INFORMATION ON THE TOTH CASE TO THE PRESS AS WELL AS MAKING THE SPEECH IN BLEO. IT IS THEIR VIEW THAT IT IS THE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO SEEK TO PREVENT UNFAVORABLE PUBLICITY IN THE U.S. RE YUGOSLAVIA. AS I ARGUE BELOW, THAT IS FUNDAMENTALLY INCORRECT, AND WITHOUT PUBLICITY TOTH WOULD STILL BE IN JAIL.

POLICY TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA

14. YOU MENTION THAT WE ARE IN BASIC AGREEMENT ON THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH YUGOSLAVIA AS REFLECTED IN MY CABLE OF JUNE 26. IN THAT CABLE I THOROUGHLY SUPPORTED YOUR SPEECH IN LONDON WHICH DEALT WITH GLOBAL AND PARTICULARLY EUROPEAN POLICY (EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF IDEOLOGY). AS I RECALL IN PARIS WE DIDN'T GET A CHANCE TO DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH YUGOSLAVIA AT GREAT LENGTH, BUT I TOLD YOU THAT LAST MARCH I HAD SUBMITTED A POLICY ASSESSMENT PAPER WHICH BOTHERED EE AND I HAVE YET TO GET A FORMAL RESPONSE TO THAT PAPER FROM THE DEPARTMENT ALTHOUGH VARIOUS OFFICIALS HAVE INDICATED DISAGREEMENT WITH MY ADVOCATING LINKAGE (AND LEVERAGE) OF OUR SCIENTIFIC AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT WITH YUGOSLAV MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL POSITIONS. CONCERNING THE DEMARCHE ON ANGOLA, I DID TELL ART MANTHAN (WHO THOROUGHLY AGREED) THAT ITS WORDING WAS TOO TOUGH SINCE IT ABSOLUTELY REQUIRED A RESPONSE ON OUR PART. IN SUBSEQUENT CABLES I ARGUED THAT WE COULD NOT TELL THE YUGOSLAVS THAT PERMITTING SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS TO ANGOLA WOULD AFFECT OUR RELATIONSHIP AND NOT RESPOND IN SOME FASHION WITHOUT SUFFERING A SERIOUS DIMINUTION OF OUR CREDIBILITY, AND OUR CREDIBILITY VIS-A-VIS YUGOSLAVIA IS OF ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE IN THE EVENT OF A POST-TITO CRISIS. AS I HAVE OFTEN SAID, IN THE LAST YEAR AND IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY ALL SOURCES, OUR MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM IN YUGOSLAVIA IS THAT TITO AND OTHERS IN THE LEADERSHIP CONSIDER US CONSIDERABLY WEAKER VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS (IN TERMS OF POLITICAL WILL) THAN WE WERE 20 OR EVEN 10 YEARS AGO. TH

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DEAL WITH THE YUGOSLAVS IS NOT ENGENDERING AN IMPRESSION OF STRENGTH. OUR BYWORD IN DEALING WITH THE YUGOSLAVS SHOULD BE RECIPROCITY. THEY CONTINUE TO CHERISH THE VIEW THAT OUR STAKE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP IS GREATER, THAN THEIRS AND THEREFORE WE WILL INVARIABLY TURN THE OTHER CHEEK. THEY PRESS ISSUES OF VITAL INTEREST TO THEM USING EVERY BIT OF LEVERAGE THEY CAN MUSTER AND HAVE OVER THE YEARS EFFECTIVELY DISARMED US FROM RESPONDING IN KIND. MOREOVER, THEY OFTEN DISSEMBLE (OUTRIGHT LIE) ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN WITH CONFIDENCE THAT WE WILL NOT FASHION A MEASURED RESPONSE.

IS. ALTHOUGH IT IS QUITE TRUE THAT YOUR OWN VIEWS ON US-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS DIFFER CONSIDERABLY FROM EE (AS EE MADE CLEAR IN MY INITIAL BRIEFINGS PRIOR TO LEAVING WASHINGTON), I REMAIN PUZZLED AT EE'S SEEKING ABILITY TO INSULATE PMS DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS FROM YOUR POLICY VIEWS. PERHAPS IT IS BECAUSE OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF PARA 16 OF YOUR CABLE. I AGREE THOROUGHLY THAT THE TIME MAY WELL COME WHEN A U.S. RESPONSE TO A SOVIET POST-TITO INITIATIVE WILL BE REQUIRED AND IT T U.S. PUBLIC OPINION, AS WAS TRUE IN ANGOLA, MAY BE DECISIVE. IT IS FOR THAT REASON THAT I FIRMLY BELIEVE WE MUST MAKE STRONGER EFFORTS TO MODERATE YUGOSLAV BEHAVIOR INIMICAL TO U.S. INTERESTS, ANDK PUBLICITY GIVEN SUCH MATTERS AS THE TOTH CASE OR YUGOSLAV MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY INSOFAR AS IT AIDS IN PRESSURING THE GOY SHOULD NOT BE ESCHewed. IT TELLS THE COGNOSCENTI NOTHING! AS CORRESPONDENT ANDREA BOROWIEC DISCOVERED RECENTLY FROM HIS RESEARCH IN WASHINGTON ON YUGOSLAV-US RELATIONS: "THERE IS NO WILL IN CONGRESS NOR AMONG THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO COME TO THE DEFENSE OF A PEOPLE WHO THROW MUD AT US IN THE UNITED NATIONS." IN OTHER WORDS, TO GENERATE SUPPORT FOR YUGOSLY INDEPENDENCE IN THE US, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT GOY UNDERSTAND THAT THEY CANNOT TAKE THE UNITED STATES FOR GRANTED AND THE PRESS WILL BE MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE DEPARTMENT IN DRIVING THAT POINT HOME. A POLICY DESIGNED TO OBTAIN THE TRUE NATURE OF U.S.-YUGOSLAV No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/05/02 : LOC-HAK-267-5-2-8 AMERICAN PEOPLE IS DOOMED TO FAILURE. IT IS TIME FOR US TO REALIZE THAT AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION IS

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AN ASSET TO THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY; IT SHOULD
NO LONGER BE REGARDED, AS IT IS BY CAREER DIPLOMATS,
AS A PAINFUL ENCUMBRANCE. I HAVE EVERY
CONFIDENCE THAT AMERICANS CAN FULLY UNDERSTAND THE
SUBTLETIES -- THE MIX OF GEOSTRATEGIC MULTILATERAL AND
IDEOLOGICAL INTERESTS -- OF A SOUND U.S. POLICY TOWARDS
YUGOSLAVIA.
CAR SILBERMAN

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